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ABSTRACT
The aim of the article is to compare the role of state property in developed countries and to obtain a more reliable estimate of the 
real share of the public sector in the Russian economy based on the dynamics of its change over the period from 2005 to 2017. 
The estimates obtained by the authors on the share of state property in the Russian economy show that the private sector plays the 
main role in the Russian economy. However, higher efficiency of the economy can be achieved by combining all the advantages of 
private and public partnership. On the basis of the study, we can conclude that Russia is gradually adopting the North American 
model of public sector participation in the economy, which is characterized by its specialization in purely state functions – defense 
and social infrastructure.
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RESUMEN
El objetivo del artículo es comparar el papel de la propiedad estatal en los países desarrollados y obtener una estimación más 
confiable de la participación real del sector público en la economía rusa en función de la dinámica de su cambio durante el período 
comprendido entre 2005 y 2017. Las estimaciones obtenidas por los autores sobre la participación de la propiedad estatal en la 
economía rusa muestran que el sector privado desempeña el papel principal en la economía rusa. Sin embargo, se puede lograr 
una mayor eficiencia de la economía combinando todas las ventajas de la asociación pública y privada. Sobre la base del estudio, 
podemos concluir que Rusia está adoptando gradualmente el modelo norteamericano de participación del sector público en la 
economía, que se caracteriza por su especialización en funciones puramente estatales: defensa e infraestructura social.
Palabras clave: propiedad estatal, economía, industria, negocios, emprendimiento.
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1. Introduction  
The analysis of the foreign countries experience shows different approaches to the share of the segment of state property in 
the economy. In some countries it is large (Greece, Italy, France, Sweden), in others it is almost absent (Japan, Luxembourg) 
or completely absent (Hong Kong), somewhere it is concentrated in small market segments (Holland). In some countries 
it is highly effective (Sweden, France), in others it is less effective (USA, Belgium). For example, the share of direct state 
production in the US is within 12% of the national output – one of the smallest among similar indicators of the developed 
countries (Heath and Norman, 2004).
Currently, the three models of the public sector are singled out: West European (France, Portugal, and a number of other 
countries, provided that due to crisis Portugal was in the default stage in 2010), North American (USA and Canada), and 
Asian (Japan and South Korea) (Tullberg, 2013).
Mainly, the West European model has a fairly large, highly efficient, generously financed public sector, characterized by a 
very diverse, sectoral structure; the North American model is specializing mainly on purely state functions, defense, and 
social infrastructure based on the system of economical financing. These two models have a clear line between private 
business and the state. For the Asian model, this line is blurred, the intertwining of interests of the state and business goes 
through representatives in power and corporate structures. Formally, this model has a small public sector, provided with 
tangible financial assistance by the state.
The analysis shows that the public sector is a heterogeneous production entity in almost all countries. On the other 
hand, successful state corporations can be found in any economic branch (D’Souza and Nash, 2017). According to the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation (Federatsii, 1993), there are three types of property in the country: private, mixed 
and state. The main objective of the advantages implementation of each property type in the development and improvement 
of the country’s economy is the formation and successful functioning of Russia’s socially-oriented economy in order to meet 
the growing needs and demands of the population.
Currently, scientists dispute regarding the proportion and effectiveness of state property in the Russian economy. Opinions 
on this issue are divided. Researchers found that in most cases privatization in Eastern Europe led to an increase in labor 
productivity (Claessens and Djankov, 2002, Brown, Earle and Telegdy, 2016, Walker, 2016, Pula, 2017), while in Russia, it 
has led to a decrease in labor productivity. In addition, the works prove that the results of privatization in different countries 
differ depending on the degree of foreign investors’ participation. The positive effect of privatization on the part of domestic 
investors in the Russian Federation was manifested only five years after its implementation. The studies (Kocenda and 
Svejnar, 2003, Estrin et al., 2009) showed that reduction in the share of state ownership tends to have a positive effect on 
the profitability, income, and other financial indicators of companies. In CIS countries, such positive effects were observed 
only when control was transferred to foreign investors.
This thesis is indirectly confirmed by the work of, which showed that in private companies, the average income per employee 
exceeded the comparable indicator for state (unitary) enterprises (based on the data of Russian companies for 2000 and 
2001). However, at the same time, a positive feature is that the public sector could achieve higher sales margins and lower 
return on capital compared to private companies.
Among the factors that affect the share and effectiveness of state property in the economy, scientists refer to characteristics 
of the institutional environment that can either increase or limit the competitiveness of companies in a particular industry 
(Wei, Xie and Zhang, 2005). The share of state property may indirectly depend on the relevance of the industry and the 
chosen method of privatization (Karolyi and Liao, 2017, Chernopiftov and Akhmetov, 2018). The results of the activities 
of state-owned companies can be substantially changed by the capital concentration.
The relationship between market value and state control may depend on specific circumstances (state ownership of blocking, 
control and / or 100% stake, as well as the degree of equity concentration). Linear dependence was found in the works of 
Mínguez-Vera and Martín-Ugedo, (Mínguez-Vera and Martín-Ugedo, 2007), E. Douarin, T. Mickiewicz (Douarin and 
Mickiewicz, 2017); Bokov and Vernikov (Bokov and Vernikov, 2008). Nonlinear dependence was discovered by Barja 
(Barja Daza, McKenzie and Urquiola, 2005). Some authors found no dependence (Omran, 2009), while Teplova (Teplova 
and Sokolova, 2017) considered the potential non-linear impact of mixed state ownership on the company’s financial 
position.
Radygin and Entov (Radygin and Entov, 2014) conducted a survey of 872 Russian joint-stock companies and found out 
that a decrease in the share of state capital led to an increase in the return on capital. They also showed that the privatization 
of 1992-1994 led to an increase in the concentration of share capital in Russian corporations. In general, the review of 
scientific papers on the impact of the size of state ownership on the economy performance indicates a lack of generally 
accepted indicators. Indirect indicators that were widely used earlier (primarily financial indicators) cannot completely 
eliminate the distortions caused by the price factor in conditions of limited competition. However, most researchers using 
various financial indicators found that the performance of state-owned enterprises is generally poorer than that of private 
companies in different countries and across different time horizons. The results of more purposeful studies that tried to 
evaluate “real” indicators contradict these conclusions.
In this regard, an urgent problem is to obtain a more reliable estimate of the real share of the public sector in the Russian 
economy.
The purpose of this study is to obtain a more reliable estimate of the real share of the public sector in the Russian economy 
A. M. Chernopiatov et al
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based on the dynamics of its change over the period from 2005 to 2017.
The tasks are as follows:
- to study theoretical and statistical data for estimating the share of state property in the Russian Federation 
economy;
- to obtain an objective assessment of the research direction.
2. Methods 
In the research process, the authors used modern tools, methods, and various forms of economic analysis. Statistical 
methods of collecting and processing primary information, methods of logical and system analysis were applied.
The basis of the study is statistical data, which allows obtaining a more objective assessment of the dynamics of the 
processes under consideration. Legislative and normative-legal acts and documents of the Russian Federation related 
to this issue were normative and empirical basis of the article. Moreover, the authors were using official data and 
other materials and sources.
The basic method used in the article is the use of a comparative method. Here it is based on statistical data from 
various sources for the period from 2005 to 2017. The authors have conducted the study and analysis of the dynamics 
of processes in the field of the public sector, entrepreneurship, and business environment. On this basis, the share of 
state property in the Russian economy and its impact on the development of entrepreneurship was assessed.
3. Results 
As of 2017, the state sector of Russia still remains dominant in the fuel, energy, and defense complexes, the medical 
and microbiological industries, communications (transport and communications), large engineering, civil aircraft 
construction, etc. The private form of property received the smallest spread in the branches of natural monopolies 
– railway transport and electric power. These industries serve as a traditional niche for public entrepreneurship or 
public-private partnerships in almost all countries. In this aspect, it can be argued that Russia is in the trend of 
developing the world economy. It should be noted that this thesis is of a general nature and it needs to be clarified. 
First, the state’s positions in traditional segments have recently been weakened. Second, the true differences in the 
construction of the public sector of the Russian Federation are seen when comparing the more detailed sectoral 
structures. The industrial part of the Russian public sector with full justification can be considered the most charged 
and problematic segment. When investigating this market segment, it should be noted that the available information 
on the share of state property requires additional verification.
In this regard, let us compare the data of 2005 and 2015 (Table 1).
Table 1. The relative size of the public sector in Russia, (%)
Branch if industry Share in the total 
output
Share in the 
total number 
of employees
Share in the 
book value of 
fixed assets
Integral share 
of the public 
sector
Industry in 2005 10,1 14,9 11,9 12,3
Industry in 2015 3,71 27,7 18,0 16,28
Sources. Compiled and calculated with the help of: Russian Statistical Yearbook. 2005: Statistical book. Rosstat. 
As can be seen from the data in Table 1, the state sector in industry is represented in small volumes, but there has 
been an increase in all indicators except for the share in the total output, compared to 2005.
On the other hand, according to data given in the source by 2010, the share of the public sector reached 50%, and 
in joint ownership (from the remaining 50%) there were more than 75% (Tompson, 2010). Official sources of the 
Government of the Russian Federation (Boubakri et al., 2016) note: “Thus, according to some expert estimates, 
in the last decade the role of the public sector in the Russian economy is increasing, and the contribution of state 
companies and the state as a subject of budget expenditures in Russia’s GDP in 2015 reaches 70% against 35% in 
2005.” In the article, some experts (Vanteeva and Hickson, 2012), recognize that state companies and the state itself 
control 70% of the Russian economy. The studies carried out by the authors do not confirm this thesis (Tables 2-4).
Table 2. Fixed assets by forms of ownership (at the end of the year, at full cost)
Year Million rubles (1990 – billion rubles)
All fixed assets Including by forms of ownership
state non-state 
1990 1927 1754 173
2000 17464172 4366043 13098729
2010 93185612 17705266 75480346
2011 108001247 19440224 88561023
2012 121268908 21828403 99440505
2013 133521531 24033876 109487655
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2014 147429656 26537338 120892318
2015 160725261 35359557 125365704
2016 183403693 42182849 141220844
2017 194649464 42822882 151826582
Source: (Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2016: 725), (Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2018: 694)
We find the share of state assets in the total amount:
Qp=(FG/OF) х100%      (1)
where, 
- Qp – share of state assets in the total amount;
- FG – state assets;
- OF – fixed assets.
Qp=(28930547/160725261)х100%=18%
The ratio of non-state assets to public assets in 2015 is calculated by formula (2):
NG=OF - FG       (2)
where,
- NG – non-state assets, %;
- OF – fixed assets, %;
- FG – state assets, %.
NG=100 - 18 = 82%
Thus, the share of state assets in relation to non-state assets is at the level of 18:82.
Distortions of the information are due to the fact that the statistics does not include the indices of the military-industrial 
complex producing and supplying for military and defensive purposes very significant products in terms of volume, cost 
and nomenclature. At the same time, a certain part of the produced products has a dual purpose and is supplied to the 
national economy of the country.
In addition, the largest corporations, concerns, and firms established over the past 15-20 years, which are mostly joint-
stock companies with state participation, in fact do not differ from state companies, since the state retains the deciding 
vote and position in the development and adoption of various kinds of decisions to ensure their effective work.
However, we must admit that such position is inherent in a certain degree for the economy of all developed countries.
 Table 3 provides official data on the number of organizations sorted by the type of ownership.
Table 3
Number of organizations sorted by the type of ownership in 2015 
(at the end of the year)
Number of organizations By the type of ownership
thousands percentage of the total
state and 
municipal private mixed
Total, thousands 4732,1 100 322,7 4377,8 31,6
In total, 
percentage of the 
total
4732,1 100 6,82 92,51 0,67
Source: Compiled and calculated with the help of: Russia in Figures. 2016: Brief statistical book /Rosstat- Moscow, 2016 - 543 p.
In the general section, we present the statistical data in Table 4 and 5.
Table 4 Distribution of enterprises and organizations by forms of ownership (at the end of the year) 
A. M. Chernopiatov et al
R
E
LI
G
A
C
IO
N
.  
VO
L 
4 
N
º 
18
, A
go
st
o 
 2
01
9,
 p
p.
 2
7-
34
31
Se
cc
ió
n 
G
en
er
al
Thousands of enterprises and organizations
Years 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of enterprises 
and organizations 
total incl. by forms of 
ownership:
3346,5 4767,3 4823,3 4843,4 4886,0 5043,6 4765 4562
state 150,8 160,4 119,4 116,1 113,7 110,7 108 103
municipal 216,6 252,1 246,4 225,3 218,9 212,0 203 196
private 2509,6 3837,6 4103,6 4159,5 4212,2 4377,8 4122 3936
property of public and 
religious organizations 
(associations)
223,0 252,5 157,0 144,9 144,4 145,4 144 141
Other forms of 
ownership, including 
mixed Russian, property 
of state corporations, 
foreign, joint Russian and 
foreign
246,5 264,7 196,8 197,6 196,7 197,7 188 186
Source: (Russia in Figures, 2016: 543) (Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2018: 694)
Table 5 presents statistics for greater visibility as a percentage of the total. Table 5 Distribution of enterprises and 
organizations by forms of ownership (at the end of the year).
As a percentage of the total
Years 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of enterprises and 
organizations total incl. by forms 
of ownership:
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
state 4,5 3,4 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,3 2,2
municipal 6,5 5,3 5,1 4,7 4,5 4,2 4.3 4,3
private 75,0 80,5 85,1 85,9 86,2 86,8 86,5 86,3
property of public and religious 
organizations (associations) 6,7 5,3 3,3 3,0 3,0 2,9 3,0 3,1
Other forms of ownership, 
including mixed Russian, 
property of state corporations, 
foreign, joint Russian and foreign
7,4 5,6 4,1 4,1 4,0 3,9 3,9 4,1
Source: (Russia in Figures, 2016: 543) (Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2018: 694)
On the basis of the data given in Tables 4 and 5, we present calculations for a more complete justification of our estimates 
of the degree of public sector participation in the Russian economy.
For this, we find the percentage of change in the state’s share for the period of 2005-2015.
Q= [(gc2005 +gm2005)/ (gc2015 +gm2015)]х100% ,  (3)
where
-gc - share of the public sector, by years
-gm - share of the municipal sector, by years
Q= [(160,42005 +252,12005)/ 110,72015 +212,02015)]х100%= -27,9%
The percentage of change in the share of the private sector in the period under review can be calculated by the formula:
Q= [gs2015)/gs2005]х100% ,  (4)
where
-gs - share of the private sector, by years
Q= [4377,82015)/3837,62005]х100%=14%   (5)
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From these calculations it is clear that the share of the public sector decreased by 27.9%, but the share of the private 
sector increased by 14%.
We should also note that the private sector in the Russian Federation, unlike the state sector, is trying not to show its 
incomes completely. It means that there are enterprises that submit only declarations, but do not perform work. A large 
share of shadow incomes in the private sector significantly affects the country’s GDP, which may increase by more than 
15% if the private sector comes out of the shadow (Crowley, 2016).
Thus, as a result of the conducted studies, we can state that the share of the public sector in the country’s economy is 
low, while the efficiency of state property in the Russian economy is not inferior to private enterprises. The question of 
accounting for the influence of the shadow incomes of Russia’s private sector is beyond the scope of this study. However, 
based on the obtained results, it is possible to predict an even greater increase in the influence of the private sector on the 
economy if it comes out of the shadow.
Our studies show that Russia is characterized by the North American public sector model, which specializes mainly 
in purely state functions – defense and social infrastructure. A distinctive feature of the Russian economy is that the 
driver of its growth is the oil and gas sector of the market, while investments in social infrastructure occur in a mode of 
economical financing.
4. Discussion
In 2011-2014, the share of the public sector in the output of goods and services had a greater weight in a number of 
economic activities, for example, internal costs for a number of research and development, and freight transport. For a 
number of other activities, the share of the public sector was in the range of more than 20%, but less than 50%:
- production of ethyl alcohol from food raw materials;
- grown trunk railway wagons;
- electricity generation at hydroelectric power stations;
- passenger transportation by road;
- oil production, including gas condensate.
However, the given statistics cannot confirm the thesis about the growth of the public sector in the country’s economy 
(Chernykh, 2008).
As we see from the previously shown results, the data appearing in the discussions do not reflect the real share of state 
property in the Russian economy.
Our work shows that in countries with transitional economies, it is necessary to provide an expanded understanding of 
the content of property relations. In its structure, along with the economic and legal components, the social one must 
be defined, which stands out from the economic. It should be objectively conditioned by the evolutionary development 
of the content of property relations with the CIS. The social component includes the consideration of the human factor, 
moral methods of increasing motivation for work, measures to improve working conditions, and social benefits.
Based on the research of the formation and development of new forms of state property, many scientists conclude that 
the manifestation of the effectiveness of the functioning of state property in Russia is dual in character (financial and 
economic, and social) (Aghion and Carlin, 1997; Yakovlev, 2006; Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard, 2008). We fully agree 
with this thesis.
We have confirmed the tendency of increasing the role of mixed property in the modern Russian economy. Other 
scientists also found that the outward manifestation of this process is the predominance of the share of mixed ownership 
in economic activity during the period of reforms (Djankov et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2005).
We believe that our study shows that for all CIS countries, the rational legal support for two independent levels of 
realization of state property (the federal and the subject of the federation) is the most advantageous model (Kudrin and 
Gurvich, 2015).
A number of economists who share the view of insufficient public sector investment activity (Oxenstierna, 2016) also 
indicate that the studies conducted by Russian scientists and practitioners do not speak of any significant differences in 
the performance of public and private enterprises. They consider the thesis of excessive redundancy in the share of state 
property in the economy of the Russian Federation an uncorroborated one by any evidence.
In the general development plan of the country’s economy, economists believe that “The current state of Russian industry 
can be called “a positive stagnation” (Mau and Ulyukaev, 2015).
According to our estimates, data on the 70% state’s participation in the economy clearly do not correspond to reality. 
On the other hand, at the present stage, many state enterprises of the Russian Federation are “points of growth” and 
the profits they receive go to the development of other industries. This can be observed by the growth of industry, 
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agriculture, and other sectors of economy. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, 
the growth of industry in Russia in 2017 will be 1.6-2%, while chemical and textile production will increase by 4% at 
once. To achieve this goal, 107 billion rubles have been allocated. It is also not a secret that the main driver of the growth 
of the Russian economy is the oil and gas market sector.
The estimates obtained by the authors on the share of state property in the Russian economy on the basis of statistical 
data for the period from 2005 to 2015 show that the main role in the Russian economy is assigned to the private sector. 
However, higher efficiency of the economy can be achieved by combining all the advantages of private and public 
partnership.
5. Conclusions  
Based on the foregoing, we believe that data on the dominance of the share of state property in the economy of the 
Russian Federation are distorted and not confirmed. According to our estimates, the private sector in the context of fixed 
assets has 82% in the economy of the country. At the same time, the number of state-owned enterprises for the period 
from 2005 to 2015 declined by 27.9%, and the private sector increased by 14%. This situation shows a tendency to a 
significant reduction in the number of public sector enterprises.
From the point of view of the economic efficiency, it is expedient to seek the optimal balance of private and state 
partnership. None of the countries has established precise criteria for the state’s share in the country’s economy. Each 
country individually comes from its own concepts, mentality, and political attitudes. In our opinion, it is necessary to 
involve the public sector in the economy at least for 50% in order to achieve the effective development of the social and 
economic infrastructure in Russia at the current stage. We proceed from the assumption that in terms of investment, the 
public sector has the necessary resources for development, and can fulfill those functions that are not yet available to the 
private or mixed sectors.
The research carried out by the authors can be used in theoretical and practical activities in order to address issues on the 
harmonization of relations between state and private forms of ownership.
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